William L. Rowe, in “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” suggests that pointless suffering on the part of animals provides evidence against God’s existence.
“Suppose in some distant forest lightning strikes a dead tree, resulting in a forest fire. In the fire a fawn is trapped, horribly burned, and lies in terrible agony for several days before death relieves its suffering. So far as we can see, the fawn’s intense suffering is pointless. For there does not appear to be any greater good such that the prevention of the fawn’s suffering would require either the loss of that good or the occurrence of an evil equally bad or worse. Nor does there seem to be any equally bad or worse evil so connected to the fawn’s suffering that it would have had to occur had the fawn’s suffering been prevented…Since the fawn’s intense suffering was preventable and, so far as we can see, pointless, doesn’t it appear that…there do exist instances of intense suffering which an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse?” (American Philosophical Quarterly 16.4 (1979): 335-341. 337.)
In this thought experiment, Rowe is considering an objection to the argument from evil. What is the objection? What point is Rowe trying to make in regard to the objection? Is his a good response? Why or why not?
write in an essay format with a conclusion, Body, and conclusion