The Divine Command Theory has been critiqued by many philosophers, most notably Plato in his dialogue the Euthyphro. In this work, Socrates poses a dilemma to Euthyphro that challenges the very foundations of DCT. The dilemma is as follows: is something good because God commands it, or does God command it because it is good? If the former is true, then it would seem that goodness is arbitrary – that what is good and bad is simply a matter of God’s whim. However, if the latter is true, then it would seem that there must be some objective standard of goodness outside of God Himself. This presents a major problem for DCT, as it either makes goodness arbitrary or places it outside of God’s control.
The Euthyphro Dilemma has been further critiqued by many philosophers since Plato, and it remains a major problem for those who subscribe to DCT. For example, if goodness is arbitrary, then how can we know what is good and what is bad? And if goodness is outside of God’s control, then how can we trust that He is good? This dilemma presents a serious challenge for DCT, and it has yet to be adequately answered.
Divine Command Theory (DCT) is a religiously grounded moral philosophy that has been critiqued on the basis of the Euthyphro Dilemma. The Euthyphro Dilemma, as posed by Plato in his dialogue of the same name, goes as follows: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" If we take the first horn of the dilemma, then DCT would be false; if we take the second horn, then DCT would be circular. In either case, DCT appears to be problematic.
There are a few ways to respond to this dilemma. One could argue that both horns are false; that is, neither the gods' love nor our concept of piety is based on the other. Another response would be to claim that the dilemma itself is false; that is, there is no reason to think that the gods' love for the pious and the pious's love for the gods are mutually exclusive. A third response would be to argue that, even if the dilemma is true, it does not show that DCT is false; rather, it simply shows that DCT is not as straightforward as it might first appear.
In any case, it seems clear that DCT faces some serious challenges in light of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Whether or not these challenges are fatal remains to be seen.
Divine Command Theory (DCT) is a religiously grounded moral philosophy that has been critiqued on the basis of the Euthyphro Dilemma. The Euthyphro Dilemma, as posed by Plato in his dialogue of the same name, goes as follows: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" If we take the first horn of the dilemma, then DCT would be false; if we take the second horn, then DCT would be circular. In either case, DCT appears to be problematic.
There are a few ways to respond to this dilemma. One could argue that both horns are false; that is, neither the gods' love nor our concept of piety is based on the other. Another response would be to claim that the dilemma itself is false; that is, there is no reason to think that the gods' love for the pious and the pious's love for the gods are mutually exclusive. A third response would be to argue that, even if the dilemma is true, it does not show that DCT is false; rather, it simply shows that DCT is not as straightforward as it might first appear.
In any case, it seems clear that DCT faces some serious challenges in light of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Whether or not these challenges are fatal remains to be seen.
Divine Command Theory (DCT) is a religiously grounded moral philosophy that has been critiqued on the basis of the Euthyphro Dilemma. The Euthyphro Dilemma, as posed by Plato in his dialogue of the same name, goes as follows: "Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods?" If we take the first horn of the dilemma, then DCT would be false; if we take the second horn, then DCT would be circular. In either case, DCT appears to be problematic.
There are a few ways to respond to this dilemma. One could argue that both horns are false; that is, neither the gods' love nor our concept of piety is based on the other. Another response would be to claim that the dilemma itself is false; that is, there is no reason to think that the gods' love for the pious and the pious's love for the gods are mutually exclusive. A third response would be to argue that, even if the dilemma is true, it does not show that DCT is false; rather, it simply shows that DCT is not as straightforward as it might first appear.
In any case, it seems clear that DCT faces some serious challenges in light of the Euthyphro Dilemma. Whether or not these challenges are fatal remains to be seen.