





**What is the condition we want to create?**

**Political Aim**

**What are the resources needed or available?**

**How should resources be used?**





**SO1.** Deter Iran from aggression against our vital interests.

**SO 2.** Prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons OR mitigate potential negative regional and global effects of Iran’s nuclear program.

**SO 3**. Safeguard the security of U.S./U.A.E. allies.

**Framework / Outline**

**(JOINT U.S/U.A.E STRATEGY TO CONTAIN IRAN )**

**Introduction**

**Problem Statement:**Iran’s destabilizing activities in the Arabian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Middle East more broadly constitute a vital threat to U.S. and U.A.E. national security, prosperity, and values and the U.S. led Liberal International Order because it has nuclear ambitions, an aggressive intercontinental ballistic missile program, and its leaders carry out global terrorism and engage in asymmetric warfare. Therefore, it is becoming significant for the U.S. and their counterparts to initiate a solid strategy for countering Iran, as they may bring lots of security threats for the entire world, and especially for the Middle East region.

**Political Aim:**The U.S. and the UAE will develop a joint strategy to contain Iranian influence in the Arabian Gulf and the Middle East more broadly while reducing Iran’s use of proxy groups to destabilize neighboring regimes and forestall its development of nuclear weapons. They also needs to develop a strong mechanism so the lethal impact of Iran’s nuclear program can be reduced, otherwise a lots of devastation may increase. The U.S. needs to raise this issue with their counterparts, especially found in the Middle-East and Asian Region

**Main body**

* **Specific Objectives (SO) 1.**  **Deter Iran from aggression against our vital interests.**
* **Supporting Objectives 1a. A more pluralistic, moderate, democratic Iranian regime**.

**line of effort 1**: pro-democracy Iranian opposition strengthened using the informational instrument to provide Iranians more access to diverse sources of information by using the internet, cell-phones, whatever. Support to pro-democracy opposition internally/externally usually takes the form of economic assistance of some type such as support for civil society groups (operating expense money, training in organization and outreach and the like, but I suspect it is going on at a very low, discreet level) + use the diplomatic instrument whereby the U.S., UAE and other allies call out Iran when they repress civil society or opposition groups. Also, by diplomatic instrument you could use multilateral organizations such as the Gulf Cooperation Council or the UN Human Rights arm to condemn such behaviour and call upon the regime to be more tolerant of dissent. The strategic aim for UAE should include the strengthening of political cooperation by studying the shared values, economic diplomacy with increasing commercial operations, as well as the distribution of results between Iran and the USA as a result of development programs[[1]](#footnote-1). The joint strategic action plan will be first discussed between the UAE and the USA, then with Iran. Moreover, regularly, the strategic plan will be evaluated and monitored by analyzing its progress and the activities of Iran in the Arabian Gulf, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Middle East[[2]](#footnote-2). The purpose of this strategic aim is to strengthen the political and economic relationships by preventing the activities of Iran that are affecting the prosperity, values, and national security of the UAE and the USA. Also, strengthen the relationships on an international level to promote economic diplomacy[[3]](#footnote-3). The strategic aim also aims to promote human rights, democracy, and economic, social, and regional integration by encouraging multilateral and bilateral cooperation. Also, the purpose of this joint strategic aim will help the USA and UAE to share political priority with Iran to prevent threats and risks (Sherwood, 2016).

**line of effort 2**:

* **Supporting Objectives 1b. UAE-led regional deterrence framework (or plan) in place.**

Moreover, to prevent threats, a hedging strategy will be beneficial to cooperate and have a conflict with Iran at the same time. It will promote the stress engagement integration that is making Iran stop terrorizing the regions of UAE and on the other hand, the socio-political and economic cooperation will be integrated to have realist style balancing. Also, the UAE and the USA will have an alliance and the military and nonmilitary capabilities will be increased in order to deal with the threatening activities of Iran[[4]](#footnote-4). The strategic competencies of the UAE will be strengthened in terms of reducing threats to its stability as a nation. The hedging strategic aim will also help to increase socio-political and economic relationships with the USA and at the same time, both these countries will deal with Iran to stop its threatening activities and cooperating with developmental programs[[5]](#footnote-5).

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* **Supporting Objectives 1c common domains remain open and free.**

Informational instruments will determine the national power in terms of a strategic resource that is important for national security[[6]](#footnote-6). The non-state actors such as terrorists and criminals will be identified by monitoring the social media activities along with cellphone records. The informational instrument will be used to determine any threatening activity by Iran even after the strategic action. Also, the collaboration between the UAE and the USA can be taken place in terms of having access to military equipment and to prevent national security. This military collaboration will be used to handle external as well as internal threats. Also, military collaboration will not only provide help to cater to regional threats but non-conflicting situations as well[[7]](#footnote-7).

* **Supporting Objectives 1d.**

Moreover, the military instrument can be used to have economic assistance such as gaining assistance from the USA to have increased relationships in global markets in terms of increasing business activities for the welfare of the military and state's economy. This can improve the UAE's economic condition for its public in terms of improving standards of living, and financial crisis[[8]](#footnote-8).

The merger of informational, economic assistance and military instruments with the strategic aim is important to promote a safe and secure environment for UAE. The above-mentioned strategic aim can only be achieved by strengthening the national power instruments to improve the economic, socio-political, diplomatic, and military situation between UAE and Iran. The hedging strategic aim will be the main focus to stop Iran from threatening activities that affect UAE and USA strategic alliance and security[[9]](#footnote-9)

**Specific Objectives (SO) 2** **Prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons OR mitigate potential negative regional and global effects of Iran’s nuclear program.**

* **Supporting Objectives 2a. Iran’s access to the means to pursue a nuclear program denied**

Lines of Effort would be sanctions using the economic instrument as primary and secondarily the diplomatic instrument to make sure that other countries abide by the sanctions. To bring back Iran to the table of negotiation with the UAE and the USA, it is important to form a strategy with three interrelated negotiations. It is possible by focusing on diplomatic and economic instruments. The three tracks of strategy can be made,

- By focusing on the economic incentives and other enrichment programs.

- By focusing on Iran’s internal security and examining the consequences of Iran threatening UAE as well as other regional security risks.

- Understanding the socio-political and economic problems among UAE, USA, and Iran.

* **Supporting Objectives 2b. Iran signs and abides by international agreement to forego further development of nuclear weapons**

lines of effort would be primarily diplomatic: bringing Iran back to the negotiating table with the US/UAE, crafting a binding agreement, getting strict verification measures in place and providing incentives (political or economic or both) to encourage Iran to negotiate, sign and abide by an agreement. This could include removal of sanctions or partial removal, targeted economic aid, trade agreements.

* **Supporting Objectives 2c.**
* The above-mentioned initiatives can bring back Iran to the negotiation table, USA is required to consider these initiatives in order to avoid nuclear Iran. The economic instrument can be beneficial to bring back Iran to the negotiation table, in terms of making the economic conditions more productive. The strong economy of Iran, the USA, and the UAE will be beneficial for their state’s national power. Supplying money, goods, and material to Iran can use an economic instrument. Also, budget and humanitarian support can be provided to improve the economic relationships and that lead towards the achievement of short and long-term goals. Multilateral assistance between UAE, USA, and Iran can be beneficial for diplomatic relationships as well[[10]](#footnote-10).
* **Supporting Objectives 2d**
* Trade as an economic instrument is also an important way to negotiate positively, and it can help the USA and UAE to bring back Iran to the negotiation table. The risk to prosperity of the USA, UAE, and Iran can be reduced by increasing trading activities between these states. Desirable advantages can be achieved in terms of bringing Iran to the negotiation table for the development of nuclear weapons. Moreover, it is important to make rules and regulations for big and small enterprises of Iran and the UAE before the start of trade[[11]](#footnote-11). To safeguard the security of the USA and UAE allies, it is important too,
* To reach the socio-political and economic goals faster as well as negotiate with Iran to make it stop the threatening actions on the Middle East regions.
* Take advantage of global and innovative technology production by promoting trade and economic relationships.
* Make better use of financial instruments in order to achieve the hedging strategic plan.
* Finding opportunities that are beneficial for both countries.
* Ensuring better military assistance and use of military alliance in times of national security threats[[12]](#footnote-12).

Collective coordination with regional partners especially UAE, Saudi Arabia and Israel can lead towards regional, economic and sociopolitical stability. Military assistance operations can be conducted to prevent the threat of war[[13]](#footnote-13)

* **Specific Objectives (SO) 3.** **Safeguard the security of U.S./U.A.E. allies.**
* **Supporting Objectives 3a. Strengthening the allies in the region.**

The operational plan and procedure for using diplomatic instruments include the building of the relationships with Iran to clarify the political and economic situation on an international level. Let the officials of Iran understand the strategic alliance of UAE and USA and their activities of government internationally. Also, to ensure that their rules and regulations are understood by Iranian officials in terms of having a foreign relationship

* **Supporting Objectives 3b. Collective coordination with regional partners especially UAE, Saudi and Israel.**

Secondly, the terms and conditions will be negotiated in terms of offering Iran economic development and business facilities as an initiative of diplomacy to produce better results of the strategic plan. It will be the plan to reach a mutual strategy that is in favor of the UAE, the USA, and Iran in order to avoid conflict.

* **Supporting Objectives 3c.**

It will set the parameters for governments, military, and business organizations to work with transactional interactions to get the best possible benefits. Lastly, the implementation will be important, bilateral and multilateral agreements will be signed in the form of business partnerships and treaty commitments. Moreover, technical assistance will be promoted among the three countries in order to avoid the threats and risks that can affect the state security of the UAE negatively[[14]](#footnote-14).

* **Supporting Objectives 3d**

Along with will diplomatic instruments, military instruments will be used in terms of empowering force upon Iran as a result of their threatening actions. The threat of force will be used to prevent the threatening actions of Iran and the socio-political and economic alliance will be promoted and encouraged between UAE and Iran. Moreover, the threat of force will be conveyed in a diplomatic manner and violence will be prevented by understanding its negative consequences on socio-political and economic circumstances of states. The priority of the UAE and the USA will be to achieve strategic aims only (National Security Strategy Primer, 2019)

**Conclusion**

To conclude it can be said that, hedging strategic plans promote profit stability between the USA, UAE, and Iran that eventually will result in gaining economic and socio-political advantages. Long-term trading can be an option for these states that may also result in a positive relationship between the nations. On the other hand, to control and avoid the risks and threats of Iran on the Middle East and Arabian region, the USA and UAE allies can be merged with Israel and Saudi Arabia to stabilize their positions. Also, the risks and threats of nuclear war can be prevented by taking Iran back on the table to negotiate the political, social, and economic circumstances and make agreements for trade and economic assistance. Moreover, it is also important to use military and informational instruments to identify the threats and actions of Iran for the UAE and the USA. Lastly, the strong ally of the USA, UAE, Israel, and Saudi Arabia can help to stabilize their regional position through economic and political negotiations.

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