Question: According to Seyla Benhabib, how have women’s voices been marginalized in moral theory?

The field of moral theory has been predominantly male-dominated, leading to the marginalization of women's voices. Seyla Benhabib, a prominent feminist philosopher, has discussed the marginalization of women's voices in moral theory extensively. According to Benhabib, women's voices have been marginalized in moral theory through the exclusion of women from the philosophical canon, the gendered nature of moral discourse, and the invisibility of women's experiences in moral theory. In this paper, we will explore Benhabib's observations about the marginalization of women's voices in moral theory and relate them to course readings discussing gender.

Exclusion of Women from the Philosophical Canon

Benhabib argues that the exclusion of women from the philosophical canon has contributed to the marginalization of women's voices in moral theory. She notes that the philosophical canon, which includes the works of prominent philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, is dominated by male voices. As a result, the perspectives and experiences of women have been ignored in moral theory.

Benhabib also notes that women have been excluded from the philosophical canon because of the gendered nature of philosophy itself. She argues that philosophy has traditionally been seen as a masculine pursuit, with women being relegated to the private sphere of the home. This gendered division of labor has resulted in women being excluded from the public sphere, including the world of philosophy.

Benhabib's observations about the exclusion of women from the philosophical canon are echoed in Susan Moller Okin's article "Women in Western Political Thought." Okin argues that the exclusion of women from political theory is not accidental but rather reflects a deliberate decision to ignore women's experiences and perspectives. She notes that even when women are mentioned in political theory, it is usually as objects of male desire rather than as agents in their own right.

Gendered Nature of Moral Discourse

Benhabib argues that the gendered nature of moral discourse has also contributed to the marginalization of women's voices in moral theory. She notes that moral discourse has traditionally been dominated by male perspectives and values, with women's experiences and perspectives being ignored or dismissed.

Benhabib also notes that moral discourse is often structured around dichotomies such as reason/emotion, public/private, and universal/particular. She argues that these dichotomies are gendered, with reason, the public sphere, and the universal being associated with masculinity, and emotion, the private sphere, and the particular being associated with femininity. As a result, women's experiences and perspectives are often excluded from moral discourse because they are seen as too emotional, too particular, or too tied to the private sphere.

Benhabib's observations about the gendered nature of moral discourse are echoed in Susan Bordo's article "Feminism, Postmodernism, and Gender-Scepticism." Bordo argues that the dichotomies that structure moral discourse are not only gendered but also hierarchical, with masculinity being valued over femininity. She notes that this hierarchy is reflected in the language of moral discourse, which often uses masculine terms to describe desirable qualities such as rationality, objectivity, and universality.

Invisibility of Women's Experiences in Moral Theory

Benhabib argues that the invisibility of women's experiences in moral theory has also contributed to the marginalization of women's voices. She notes that moral theory has traditionally focused on abstract principles and universal values, with little attention paid to the concrete experiences of individuals, particularly women.

Benhabib also notes that the invisibility of women's experiences in moral theory is a result of the gendered nature of knowledge production. She argues that knowledge has traditionally been produced by men, who have been seen as the "knower," while women have been relegated to the position of the "known." As a result, women's experiences have been ignored or dismissed as not worthy of inclusion in moral theory.

Benhabib's observations about the invisibility of women's experiences in moral theory are echoed in Sandra Lee Bartky's article "Foucault, Femininity, and the Modernization of Patriarchal Power." Bartky argues that women's experiences have been marginalized in philosophy and other fields because they have been seen as irrelevant to the pursuit of knowledge. She notes that this exclusion of women's experiences has resulted in a distorted view of reality, with the experiences of half of the population being ignored.

Relating Benhabib's Observations to Course Readings

Benhabib's observations about the marginalization of women's voices in moral theory are related to several course readings that discuss gender. In particular, they are related to Joan Acker's article "Hierarchies, Jobs, Bodies: A Theory of Gendered Organizations" and Patricia Hill Collins' article "Toward a New Vision: Race, Class, and Gender as Categories of Analysis and Connection."

Acker argues that organizations are gendered because they reflect and reinforce gender hierarchies. She notes that gender hierarchies are based on the belief that men are superior to women and that women's work is less valuable than men's work. As a result, women are excluded from certain jobs and are paid less than men for doing the same work. This gendered organization of work contributes to the marginalization of women's voices in moral theory because it reinforces the belief that women's experiences are less valuable than men's experiences.

Collins argues that race, class, and gender are interconnected systems of oppression that work together to marginalize certain groups of people. She notes that these systems of oppression are based on the belief that certain groups are inferior to others and that their experiences and perspectives are not worthy of inclusion in mainstream discourse. This marginalization of certain groups contributes to the marginalization of women's voices in moral theory because women are often part of these marginalized groups.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Seyla Benhabib's observations about the marginalization of women's voices in moral theory are important for understanding the ways in which women have been excluded from the field of philosophy. Benhabib argues that women's voices have been marginalized in moral theory through the exclusion of women from the philosophical canon, the gendered nature of moral discourse, and the invisibility of women's experiences in moral theory. Her observations are echoed in course readings that discuss gender, particularly those that focus on the intersection of race, class, and gender in systems of oppression. It is important to continue to challenge and question the exclusion of women's voices from philosophy and other fields in order to create a more inclusive and just society.